Wi-Fi in Zephyr firmware: identifiers and CRA notes

What it is

Wi-Fi

• Repository

Notes on this component

Wi-Fi management and the L2 layer. CVE family is management-frame and supplicant handling, much of it reachable by anything in radio range. Note that on most boards the Wi-Fi firmware itself is a vendor binary and not covered by this row; those are listed separately as their own binary components, and the vendor's own advisories are the source for them. The advisories here are filed against the in-tree drivers, which is where this row's code sits: CVE-2026-17054 (the ESP-hosted SPI driver's frame reassembly reads out of bounds and loses reception permanently, fixed in 4.4.2), CVE-2026-14366 (the SiWx91x driver unreferences a caller-owned transmit packet twice, giving a use-after-free, fixed in 4.4.2) and CVE-2026-1679 (the eswifi driver does not bound a socket send payload length, affecting 4.3 and earlier, no fix version recorded). CVE-2023-4259, CVE-2020-13600 and CVE-2026-10664 are the earlier eS-WiFi and nrf_wifi driver faults. Nothing has been filed against the management and L2 layer itself as of 9 October 2026.

Where it hides in a firmware SBOM

It is compiled into the kernel image when CONFIG_WIFI is y. It does not appear in west spdx output; the only trace is the .config file in your build directory.

The identifiers we assign

CPEthe product name vulnerability databases use to say what a flaw affects

cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:{version}:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

{version} is filled in from your build. The version is the same as your Zephyr version.

The SBOM check adds these identifiers to a component your build listed without them.

Honest gaps

Vendor: zephyrproject.

This row has no PURL.

Where this row comes from

https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-mq9g-c5j9-79v5
Checked on 9 October 2026.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked yet

Vulnerability data changes daily. Check the version you ship in the SBOM check.

CRA notes

• List this component in your SBOM. Annex I, Part II (1): Identify and document components and vulnerabilities, including an SBOMKnow what is in your product. Identify and document its components and their vulnerabilities, including by producing a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a common machine-readable format that covers at least the top-level dependencies.
• Ship the version with no known exploitable vulnerabilities at release. Annex I, Part I (2(a)): Made available without known exploitable vulnerabilitiesWhen you place a release on the market, it must not ship with known vulnerabilities that can be exploited in your product. "Exploitable" means an attacker could effectively use it under practical operating conditions (Article 3(41)), not only in theory or in a lab. The Commission's draft guidance (C(2026) 5252, points 231 to 237; a draft, not binding) gives three ways a vulnerability is "known". One: it is listed in a relevant public vulnerability database, such as the European vulnerability database (EUVD) or another prominent one. Two: you learned of it from information that is not public, for example a security researcher's coordinated disclosure or your own testing and analysis; a vulnerability you know about and have not disclosed still counts. Three: it has been publicly and prominently reported in reliable media, whether specialist security publications or general news. A report is not yet proof: it does not by itself mean the vulnerability can be exploited in practice or applies to your product, so investigate promptly and confirm whether it does. A limited time may pass between the first report and that confirmation. If a vulnerability becomes known shortly before release, you decide from your cybersecurity risk assessment whether the release can go out or the vulnerability must be fixed first. Weigh its severity, exploitability and potential impact, and the risks to the product once in use; you may also weigh the risks of delaying the release, for example because it fixes other exploitable vulnerabilities. After release, the Part II vulnerability handling requirements still apply. Check your components against vulnerability databases before each release, and fix or justify what you find.
• An SBOM without this subsystem under-reports what is in the image. Annex I, Part II (1): Identify and document components and vulnerabilities, including an SBOMKnow what is in your product. Identify and document its components and their vulnerabilities, including by producing a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a common machine-readable format that covers at least the top-level dependencies.

Source: Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), legal state 2026.10.13-1.

Related Zephyr components

No related components yet.

Guides that mention Wi-Fi

• The EU declaration of conformity for connected devices: the CRA section beside RED and EMC
• Is your cloud backend part of your product?
• What "important" and "critical" mean in the CRA: the product tiers in plain English
• Choosing and changing your CRA support period: shorter than five years, extending, variants, and the end-of-support notice
• The CRA for ESP-IDF teams: real CPEs out of the box, and the parts they do not cover
• The CRA for Yocto teams: what the law asks, what create-spdx gives you, and what is left
• Firmware SBOMs that actually match CVEs: identifiers, CPE versus purl, and where C libraries hide
• Only what you built: which CVEs matter when part of a big component is compiled, and how to record "not affected, not built"

Next step

Declarable prepares documentation for you to review. It is not legal advice and not certification. You sign your own declaration of conformity.