Nordic CryptoCell and Oberon crypto libraries in Zephyr firmware: identifiers and CRA notes

What it is

Nordic CryptoCell and Oberon crypto libraries

• Repository

Notes on this component

Same component as the `nordic-cc3xx-crypto` blob row (same `upstream.name`, which deliberately covers the CryptoCell AND Oberon families together — see that row): this is the Oberon software PSA Crypto driver, used when no CryptoCell hardware accelerator is present (nRF54L parts) or not selected. `CONFIG_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CC3XX` (the sibling row) is the hardware-accelerated alternative; a build may enable either or both. The cryptography in it comes from Oberon microsystems, which files advisories under its own name, not Nordic's. Against its ocrypto library: CVE-2025-7071 (AES-CBC PKCS#7 padding removal was not constant-time, a padding oracle that recovers plaintext, affecting 3.1.0 to 3.9.1, fixed in 3.9.2) and CVE-2026-16458 (the same class of timing leak in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption, affecting 3.0.0 to 4.0.0, partly fixed in 4.0.1). Against Oberon PSA Crypto: CVE-2025-7383 (the AES-CBC leak, fixed in 1.5.1) and CVE-2026-16459 (the RSA leak, fixed in 2.1.1). It ships as a prebuilt binary with no CPE and does not state which Oberon version it carries, so none of these will appear in a match here: a maker has to compare the versions in the nRF Connect SDK release notes against Oberon's advisories. Checked 10 October 2026.

Where it hides in a firmware SBOM

It is compiled into the kernel image when CONFIG_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_OBERON is y. It does not appear in west spdx output; the only trace is the .config file in your build directory.

The identifiers we assign

No PURL and no CPE are recorded for this row.

{version} is filled in from your build. The version is read from the version your SBOM already carries for it.

The SBOM check adds these identifiers to a component your build listed without them.

Honest gaps

Vendor: nordicsemiconductor.

This row has no CPE and no PURL, so feeds cannot be matched by identifier.

Where this row comes from

https://www.oberon.ch/security-advisories/cve-2026-16458/
Checked on 10 October 2026.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked yet

Vulnerability data changes daily. Check the version you ship in the SBOM check.

CRA notes

• List this component in your SBOM. Annex I, Part II (1): Identify and document components and vulnerabilities, including an SBOMKnow what is in your product. Identify and document its components and their vulnerabilities, including by producing a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a common machine-readable format that covers at least the top-level dependencies.
• Ship the version with no known exploitable vulnerabilities at release. Annex I, Part I (2(a)): Made available without known exploitable vulnerabilitiesWhen you place a release on the market, it must not ship with known vulnerabilities that can be exploited in your product. "Exploitable" means an attacker could effectively use it under practical operating conditions (Article 3(41)), not only in theory or in a lab. The Commission's draft guidance (C(2026) 5252, points 231 to 237; a draft, not binding) gives three ways a vulnerability is "known". One: it is listed in a relevant public vulnerability database, such as the European vulnerability database (EUVD) or another prominent one. Two: you learned of it from information that is not public, for example a security researcher's coordinated disclosure or your own testing and analysis; a vulnerability you know about and have not disclosed still counts. Three: it has been publicly and prominently reported in reliable media, whether specialist security publications or general news. A report is not yet proof: it does not by itself mean the vulnerability can be exploited in practice or applies to your product, so investigate promptly and confirm whether it does. A limited time may pass between the first report and that confirmation. If a vulnerability becomes known shortly before release, you decide from your cybersecurity risk assessment whether the release can go out or the vulnerability must be fixed first. Weigh its severity, exploitability and potential impact, and the risks to the product once in use; you may also weigh the risks of delaying the release, for example because it fixes other exploitable vulnerabilities. After release, the Part II vulnerability handling requirements still apply. Check your components against vulnerability databases before each release, and fix or justify what you find.
• This ships as a binary. Ask the vendor for their SBOM and their advisory feed. A request you can send Annex I, Part II (1): Identify and document components and vulnerabilities, including an SBOMKnow what is in your product. Identify and document its components and their vulnerabilities, including by producing a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a common machine-readable format that covers at least the top-level dependencies.

Source: Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), legal state 2026.10.13-1.

Related Zephyr components

No related components yet.

Guides that mention Nordic CryptoCell and Oberon crypto libraries

• The CRA for Zephyr developers: what the law asks, what west spdx gives you, and what is left

Next step

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