littlefs in Zephyr firmware: identifiers and CRA notes

What it is

littlefs

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Notes on this component

littlefs, a power-loss-safe filesystem for flash. It parses on-flash metadata written by earlier runs, so corrupt or hostile flash content is its attack surface. Zephyr's repository describes its copy as not a mirror of the official one, so the commit in `west.yml` is not an upstream commit. No advisory found against the upstream littlefs library (littlefs-project/littlefs) as of 10 October 2026: its GitHub security advisories list is empty, NVD has no CPE for it, and no NVD record names it as the affected product. The one CVE whose title names littlefs, CVE-2020-13599 (settings stored on a littlefs partition were given incorrect default permissions), is filed against Zephyr 1.14.2 and 2.3.0 and earlier — a flaw in Zephyr's settings integration, not in this library.

Also a subsystem, switched on by CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM_LITTLEFS. littlefs, the power-loss-resilient flash file system, vendored as a Zephyr module. CVE family is on-flash metadata parsing and recovery paths. Version comes from the littlefs module component rather than the kernel. No CPE is recorded because there is no established vendor:product pair for it. One advisory touches littlefs in Zephyr, and it is about what is stored on it rather than the filesystem code: CVE-2020-13599, where the settings subsystem writes security material — Bluetooth mesh keys among it — unencrypted, and MCUmgr's file management could then copy it off the device, because that file management only supported littlefs. Fixed in 2.4.0. Nothing has been filed against littlefs's own metadata and recovery paths in Zephyr as of 9 October 2026; upstream littlefs releases fixes without CVEs, so the module revision matters as much as this list.

Where it hides in a firmware SBOM

Zephyr lists a west module by its west name, with no PURL or CPE. Vulnerability feeds cannot find it from that listing alone, which is why the SBOM check adds the identifiers below.

It is compiled into the kernel image when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM_LITTLEFS is y. It does not appear in west spdx output; the only trace is the .config file in your build directory.

The identifiers we assign

PURLpackage URL: a standard way to name a software package

pkg:github/littlefs-project/littlefs@{version}

{version} is filled in from your build. The version is read from the upstream release tag.

The SBOM check adds these identifiers to a component your build listed without them.

Honest gaps

Vendor: littlefs-project.

This row has no CPE.

Where this row comes from

https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-5qhg-j6wc-4f6q
Checked on 10 October 2026.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked yet

Vulnerability data changes daily. Check the version you ship in the SBOM check.

CRA notes

• List this component in your SBOM. Annex I, Part II (1): Identify and document components and vulnerabilities, including an SBOMKnow what is in your product. Identify and document its components and their vulnerabilities, including by producing a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a common machine-readable format that covers at least the top-level dependencies.
• Ship the version with no known exploitable vulnerabilities at release. Annex I, Part I (2(a)): Made available without known exploitable vulnerabilitiesWhen you place a release on the market, it must not ship with known vulnerabilities that can be exploited in your product. "Exploitable" means an attacker could effectively use it under practical operating conditions (Article 3(41)), not only in theory or in a lab. The Commission's draft guidance (C(2026) 5252, points 231 to 237; a draft, not binding) gives three ways a vulnerability is "known". One: it is listed in a relevant public vulnerability database, such as the European vulnerability database (EUVD) or another prominent one. Two: you learned of it from information that is not public, for example a security researcher's coordinated disclosure or your own testing and analysis; a vulnerability you know about and have not disclosed still counts. Three: it has been publicly and prominently reported in reliable media, whether specialist security publications or general news. A report is not yet proof: it does not by itself mean the vulnerability can be exploited in practice or applies to your product, so investigate promptly and confirm whether it does. A limited time may pass between the first report and that confirmation. If a vulnerability becomes known shortly before release, you decide from your cybersecurity risk assessment whether the release can go out or the vulnerability must be fixed first. Weigh its severity, exploitability and potential impact, and the risks to the product once in use; you may also weigh the risks of delaying the release, for example because it fixes other exploitable vulnerabilities. After release, the Part II vulnerability handling requirements still apply. Check your components against vulnerability databases before each release, and fix or justify what you find.
• An SBOM without this subsystem under-reports what is in the image. Annex I, Part II (1): Identify and document components and vulnerabilities, including an SBOMKnow what is in your product. Identify and document its components and their vulnerabilities, including by producing a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a common machine-readable format that covers at least the top-level dependencies.

Source: Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), legal state 2026.10.13-1.

Related Zephyr components

No related components yet.

Guides that mention littlefs

• The CRA for Zephyr developers: what the law asks, what west spdx gives you, and what is left

Next step

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