A modern crypto library, available to ESP-IDF projects as a managed component. NVD has no CPE for libsodium itself (only for the unrelated Python binding `sodiumoxide`), so matching is by name and by watching the upstream repository, not by CPE — the same situation as ACPICA in the Zephyr rows.
Where it hides in a firmware SBOM
ESP-IDF records it from the component's own sbom.yml file, so what the SBOM says depends on what that file declares.
The identifiers we assign
package URL: a standard way to name a software package
pkg:github/jedisct1/libsodium@{version}
{version} is filled in from your build.
The SBOM check adds these identifiers to a component your build listed without them.
Honest gaps
Vendor: not recorded. The recipe names the product but not who publishes it, and we do not guess vendors. A * vendor matches records for any product called libsodium, including unrelated ones.
Vulnerability data changes daily. Check the version you ship in the SBOM check.
CRA notes
List this component in your SBOM. Annex I, Part II (1): Know what is in your product. Identify and document its components and their vulnerabilities, including by producing a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a common machine-readable format that covers at least the top-level dependencies.
Ship the version with no known exploitable vulnerabilities at release. Annex I, Part I (2(a)): When you place a release on the market, it must not ship with known vulnerabilities that can be exploited in your product. "Exploitable" means an attacker could effectively use it under practical operating conditions (Article 3(41)), not only in theory or in a lab. The Commission's draft guidance (C(2026) 5252, points 231 to 237; a draft, not binding) gives three ways a vulnerability is "known". One: it is listed in a relevant public vulnerability database, such as the European vulnerability database (EUVD) or another prominent one. Two: you learned of it from information that is not public, for example a security researcher's coordinated disclosure or your own testing and analysis; a vulnerability you know about and have not disclosed still counts. Three: it has been publicly and prominently reported in reliable media, whether specialist security publications or general news. A report is not yet proof: it does not by itself mean the vulnerability can be exploited in practice or applies to your product, so investigate promptly and confirm whether it does. A limited time may pass between the first report and that confirmation. If a vulnerability becomes known shortly before release, you decide from your cybersecurity risk assessment whether the release can go out or the vulnerability must be fixed first. Weigh its severity, exploitability and potential impact, and the risks to the product once in use; you may also weigh the risks of delaying the release, for example because it fixes other exploitable vulnerabilities. After release, the Part II vulnerability handling requirements still apply. Check your components against vulnerability databases before each release, and fix or justify what you find.
Source: Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), legal state 2026.10.13-1.